Are airstrikes an effective tool against insurgent organizations? Despite the question's historical and contemporary relevance, we have few dedicated studies, and even less consensus, about airpower's effectiveness in counterinsurgency wars. To answer this question, I draw on declassified United States Air Force records of nearly 23,000 airstrikes and non-lethal shows of force in Afghanistan (2006-11), satellite imagery, and a new SQL-enabled form of dynamic matching to estimate the causal effects of airstrikes on insurgent attacks over variable temporal and spatial windows. Evidence consistently indicates that airstrikes markedly increase insurgent attacks relative to non-bombed locations for at least 90 days after a strike. Civilian casualties play little role in explaining post-strike insurgent responses, however. Instead, these attacks appear driven by reputational concerns, as insurgent organizations step up their violence after air operations to maintain their reputations for resolve in the eyes of local populations. * This paper was made possible by a small army of research assistants at Yale
Don't hit someone else's door with a finger because your door might be hit with a fist.
Dari Proverb
Are airstrikes an effective tool against insurgent organizations? Since 1911, when the first halting steps toward aerial bombardment were made by Italian pilots over Tripolitania's deserts, states have sought to harness airpower's destructiveness to the task of defeating insurgents. The past decade alone has witnessed extensive air campaigns against insurgents in Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Palestine, Russia, Somalia, Myanmar, Syria, Sudan, Mali, Nigeria, Colombia, and Libya. Yet we possess only a handful of (contradictory) studies of airpower's effects in counterinsurgency wars.
1 Indeed, nearly all existing work on airpower remains interstate and crossnational in focus, where "effectiveness" is usually defined in terms of strategic outcomes such as victory/defeat. 2 Here, too, there is substantial debate over airpower's effectiveness across time and in high-profile cases such as Kosovo.
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I take up the challenge of testing airpower's effects in counterinsurgency wars. To do so,
I use declassified United States Air Force (USAF) data and open source satellite imagery
to detail nearly 23,000 air operations in Afghanistan (2006-11) . These air operations are divided between airstrikes and shows of force-simulated bombing runs where no weapons are released-and facilitate testing both the effects of airstrikes and the mechanisms that shape insurgent responses. I draw on the advantages of an SQL relational database to implement a new form of dynamic matching that estimates causal effects of air operations over variable temporal and spatial windows as fine-grained as a single day and kilometer around bombed villages and their controls. Satellite imagery is employed to identify the targets of these airstrikes, permitting a much more fine-grained testing of mechanisms behind these effects, including the oft-cited claim that civilian casualties increase insurgent attacks.
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Four main findings emerge. First, airstrikes are strongly associated with net increases in the mean number of post-strike insurgent attacks in targeted villages relative to control villages. Second, these increases are fairly long-lived, lasting at least 120 days after an air operation, though the magnitude of the effect dissipates over time.
Third and perhaps most counterintuitively, these effects are not associated with civilian casualties. Instead, the Taliban respond in equal measure to airstrikes that do, and do not, kill civilians. Instead, a different mechanism, one that privileges the role of reputational dynamics, may be at work. Given their destructive and highly visible nature, airstrikes create incentives for insurgent organizations to invest in reputations for resolve in the eyes of local populations by striking back at counterinsurgent forces. Failure to do so may embolden civilians to withhold support or even defect from the insurgency, challenging its ability to maintain control and possibly given rise to armed counter-mobilization. Fourth, and consistent with a reputational account, insurgents also respond to non-lethal shows of force with additional violence, an odd finding if civilian casualties are driving insurgent violence. These results are robust to multiple placebo tests, cross-validation with two different datasets of insurgent violence, and alternative statistical models.
Airpower and Insurgent Violence: The Debate
Though studies remain few and far between, we can nonetheless identify two broad positions in the debate over airpower's effectiveness in counterinsurgency wars.
As early as the 1920s, for example, strategists heralded the advent of airpower as a cheap, effective, and "civilized" means of fighting rebel forces. 4 Prominent early advocates, including Winston Churchill, Hugh Trenchard, and Giulio Douhet, were influenced by their experiences in "aerial policing" campaigns-including Somaliland, Mesopotamia, Tripolitania, Northwest Frontier Province, and Transjordan-that bombing restive populations was both desirable and feasible. 5 More recently, Schelling's own writings, though typically associated with nuclear strategy, actually draw heavily on airpower examples (especially Vietnam) to illustrate the properties of "ideal" coercive acts.
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Scholars have cited at least three airpower strategies -decapitation, attrition, and pun- 4 Peck 1928; Chamier 1921. 5 Van Creveld 2011, 51-78. 6 Schelling 2008, 6,8,13,16,17-18,25,30 . All of these references are from the first chapter alone.
ishment -that individually and collectively should decrease insurgent attacks. 7 Airstrikes may cripple insurgent organizations by decapitating their leaders, degrading command and control structures and in turn reducing their capacity to conduct attacks. Airstrikes may also influence insurgent actions through attrition of an organization's rank-and-file. Killing insurgents at a faster clip than the replacement rate may reduce future attacks by shrinking the available pool of rebels while dissuading would-be insurgents from taking up arms.
Airstrike effects might also be governed by a punishment logic among insurgent supporters.
Bombing may persuade supporters to curb their material aid to the insurgency, withhold information about counterinsurgent behavior, place operational restrictions on attacks, and, most drastically, switch sides.
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A careful study of nearly 400 drone strikes in Pakistan (2007-11) illustrates how airstrikes can negatively affect militant violence. 9 Using an agency-and week-level fixed effects estimation strategy, these authors conclude that militant attacks decreased an average of almost five percentage points during weeks with at least one drone strike. Moreover, the lethality of these militant attacks decreased by nearly 25 percentage points during the week of a drone strike. While the authors caution against making strong causal claims given their empirical strategy, 10 these findings suggest that airpower can reduce insurgent attacks in a modern counterinsurgency setting.
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A second camp has challenged these claims and instead has converged on an unflattering view of airpower's use in counterinsurgency contexts as (at best) a fool's errand and, at worst, counterproductive. As one survey put it, "the use of airpower in [civil] wars has been the record of almost uninterrupted failure." 12 Existing studies of strategic bombing have concluded that these campaigns are unlikely to bring about desired outcomes. 13 If airpower against states is typically ineffective, then counterinsurgency wars represent the edge case, since insurgents typically lack the key assets-capitals, infrastructure, and fielded forces-that must be threatened if airpower is to have a chance at being 7 Pape 1996; Waxman 2002. 8 Byman and Waxman 2002; Lyall 2009 . 9 Johnston and Sarhabi 2013, 36. 10 Johnston and Sarhabi 2013, 27,40. 11 More generally, Byman (2006) and Johnston (2012) argue that decapitation strikes can degrade insurgent capabilities and help bring about counterinsurgent victories.
12 Van Creveld 2011, 338 . 13 Pape 1996; Corum and Johnson 2003; Byman and Waxman 2002; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Clodfelter 1989; Thies 1980. successful. Even simply identifying insurgents can be difficult if they blend within the population. Civilians may also not exercise any influence over insurgent decision-making, making punishment futile. Some insurgent organizations may be sufficiently decentralized to foil leadership decapitation efforts.
14 As Robert Pape concludes, "Guerrillas should be largely immune to coercion." by using violence to drive home the message that they retain the organizational capacity to harm opponents.
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Insurgents, for example, are clearly engaged in a struggle to impose costs on the counterinsurgent. Maintaining a reputation for resolve and resiliency in the face of coercive challenges is therefore valuable since it shapes the likelihood and nature of the war's eventual political settlement. Demonstrating the ability to absorb punishment and still inflict harm on the counterinsurgent thus becomes an important goal for the insurgent organization. Continued attacks are a kind of currency that pays for eventual gains at the negotiating table even if the material cost to the counterinsurgent is modest. Battlefield losses may not undermine an insurgent organization's leverage; instead, losses may actively bolster it by revealing new information to the counterinsurgent about insurgents' cost tolerance and persistence.
20 In this view, strategies of attrition may not have a tipping point; instead, they create incentives to continue fighting even if losses mount.
These incentives suggest that the tit-for-tat rhythm of initiating, absorbing and then responding to harm inflicted may be the preferred state of affairs for at least some insurgent organizations. Insurgents are not (mis)guided by false optimism about their prospects of overturning the prevailing balance of power. 21 Given the protracted nature of most insurgencies, it is clear that these organizations are only too aware of the relative power imbalance. In fact, as power asymmetries increase, the incentives for investing in one's reputations for resilience via costly war-fighting actually increase as the returns for inflicting harm accrue disproportionately to the weaker side. War-fighting is thus about absorbing and then inflicting costs to demonstrate to the counterinsurgent that a political solution is preferable to a continuation of a grinding, increasingly futile, war.
Insurgents must also appeal to a second audience: their local supporters. The degradation of militant capabilities caused by airstrikes can challenge the ability of insurgent organizations to retain control of a given population. Insurgent losses may embolden locals to defect to the counterinsurgent's side, for example. This may take the form of withholding material assistance such as food and shelter or the imposition of restrictions on operations as local leaders organize to limit the damage from airstrikes. Local informants may also provide tips to the counterinsurgent about insurgent identities and behavior. At the ex-
19 On the importance of territorial control in civil war, see Kalyvas 2006. 20 This mirrors the logic of coercion in interstate crises where weaker states invest in reputations for resolve by fighting against stronger opponents to forestall future exploitation. See Sechser 2010, 653 . 21 Mack 1975; Blainey 1988, 56. treme, civilians may even counter-mobilize against insurgents by forming their own militia or siding openly with counterinsurgent forces.
Violence therefore becomes a means by which insurgent organizations can blunt the counterinsurgent's efforts to drive a wedge between rebels and locals. Failure to respond may in fact invite whispers that control is slipping away. The Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan, for example, "came to realize that the increasingly effective drone strikes made them look weak," and they began taking precautions (including cordoning off attack sites) to discourage rumors of weakness from spreading. 22 Revealing the capacity to "hit back" at the counterinsurgent after an airstrike thus carries the implicit message that these coercive abilities could also be turned against would-be civilian defectors and wavering insurgents.
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Defection can also take the form of locals throwing their weight behind another insurgent organization that appears to be more effective against the counterinsurgent. The potential emergence of a rival organization and the corresponding loss of "market share"
will further reinforce the value of a reputation for resolve against counterinsurgent forces.
By imposing costs on the counterinsurgent, an insurgent organization could satisfy popular demands while forestalling the entry (or creation) of rival organizations in an area.
Indeed, local civilians may even shrug off casualties inflicted by insurgents while striking back, particularly if those individuals have been victimized by the counterinsurgent.
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Given these reputational dynamics, even shows of force, which impose no material costs on insurgents or populations, should influence insurgent behavior. They are highly visible reminders of both the counterinsurgent's ability to impose costs and the lack of a symmetrical insurgent reply. These signals may also serve as visible reminders of the counterinsurgent's hated occupation. 25 Rather than rest on a purely attritional logic, the reputational argument advanced here suggests that shows of force should trigger the same response from insurgents as airstrikes. Contrary to existing theories, non-lethal shows of force do represent credible threats but are spurs, not deterrents, to future action.
22 Shah 2013, 242. 23 These threats may actually materialize as concerted efforts to assassinate suspected collaborators. An additional empirical test of this argument would be tracking changes in violence against civilians before and after these air operations.
24 Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013. 25 Alternatively, insurgents may fear that such displays drive a wedge between insurgents and civilians by illustrating the counterinsurgent's comparative restraint. Emphasizing such restraint, along with the provision of aid and services, is a central plank of ISAF's "hearts and minds" campaign in Afghanistan, for example.
The nature of the rebel-population relationship is therefore an important mediating variable. We should not expect all insurgent organizations to respond in identical fashion to attempted coercion. Instead, the effects of airpower are likely conditional on two factors: the extent of rebel governance in an area and the number of potential rival insurgent organizations.
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Scholars have now turned their attention to studying rebel governance in civil wars.
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It is possible to array rebel-civilian "social orders"
28 along a simple spectrum from coercive to consensual relationships. 
Context
To test these competing accounts, I draw on multiple sources to construct a dataset of nearly 23,000 airstrikes and shows of force in Afghanistan during 2006-11. The bulk of the dataset stems from declassified data from the USAF Central Command's (AFCENT)
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Southwest Asia, which record the location, 32 An expanded view might include property damage since it lowers the opportunity costs of becoming an insurgent. I test this alternative grievance-based account below. date, platform, and type/number of bombs dropped between January 2008 and December
2011.
Substantial recoding was required before these data could be used since the Air Force did not code its airstrikes consistently over time. For example, it is possible for an airstrike in which five bombs were released on a target to be coded as a single airstrike (since one target was hit) or five (given how many weapons were released). I therefore recoded events to remove duplicates and to unify multiple observations that occur in roughly the same location and time into a single airstrike regardless of the number of aircraft involved or weapons released.
33 The same coding procedure was followed for shows of force to avoid inflating our number of observations by falsely treating related observations as independent.
Events where both an airstrike and a show of force were used were dropped from this analysis to allow for "clean" estimates of the effects of each type of air operation singularly. Once merged, these data sources illustrate the importance of seeking multiple sources of data in conflict settings. There is almost no overlap between CAOC, CIDNE, and DAPS data; only 448 events were found in all three sources. Table 2 summarizes these data while A small number of observations were dropped because they did not occur within 10 km 2 of a populated location. Matching requires a specific point (e.g., a village) in order to identify controls and calculate spatial windows and so air operations were clipped to the closest populated location. CAOC and CIDNE data use 10-digit Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) coordinates to assign locations; these are accurate to one meter resolution.
33 Events occurring within .5km and three hours of one another were collapsed into a single event. Note: a Data for 2011 are partly incomplete, with airstrikes and shows of force recorded until 8 December and 2 December, respectively. The "mixed" category captures events where both airstrikes and shows of force are recorded and are dropped from this analysis.
DAPS records were merged using village and district names that were cross-referenced with village location data from Afghanistan's Central Statistical Office (see below). but that did not receive the treatment. 34 These counterfactuals provide baseline observations that (ideally) adjust for selection processes, key covariates that might otherwise explain outcomes, and temporal trends not connected to the treatment.
Our empirical investigation here is aided by quasi-randomness in the assignment of airstrikes (and shows of force) to specific insurgent events. For example, strike aircraft are sortied daily to fly over Afghanistan in pre-determined "race track" patterns and are a relatively scarce commodity; only a fraction of daily insurgent attacks are countered with an air operation. The likelihood of a specific attack being met depends on a mix of aircraft availability, distance to the event, suitability for the desired mission, and the nature (and length) of the insurgent attack itself. Aircraft operating cycles are unknown to insurgents, who lack the ability to monitor aircraft flight patterns. Attacks are therefore not conditioned on a known probability of experiencing an airstrike at that specific location.
Air Force planners also face difficulty in tasking aircraft to events since the daily set of insurgent attacks is (obviously) unknown to them as well. As one interviewee noted, the Air Force acts as a "bucket brigade," trying to extinguish as many fires as possible each daily but without knowing where and when the next fire will occur.
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Despite this contingency in treatment assignment, however, the empirical strategy been matched with similar controls or are dropped due to the absence of a suitable match.
The result is a better fit between theoretical expectations and empirical strategy. It becomes possible to conduct longitudinal analysis of effects over different spatio-temporal boundaries while testing possible mechanisms at close range. Each covariate also has its own "caliper" that governs the strictness of the required matching procedure. This in turn facilitates robustness checks, as we are able to test the stability of estimates across different types of matching (e.g., exact, nearest neighbor) while using substantive knowledge to decide how strict the matching procedure should be across covariates.
In the analysis below, I estimate the causal effects of air operations across multiple temporal windows (from 7 to 120 days post-event) and spatial boundaries (from 2km 2 to 100km 2 ) around a village. I provide estimates using exact matching for all dynamic covariates and then repeat the procedure using a less restrictive criterion for goodness of matching. 37 All matching is done with replacement. Villages are eligible to be controls until they experience either an airstrike or a show of force, after which they are removed from the pool of possible controls. In cases where multiple control cases are identified, one is chosen using a random seeding strategy to prevent "fitting" or overusing a particular control observation.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, attacks, is defined as the difference-in-difference in mean insurgent attacks against ISAF forces between treated and control villages before and after each airstrike over identical time periods. 38 More formally, the difference-in-difference estimator is obtained:
, where Y x ∈ (0, 1) are the pre-and post-treatment periods, T denotes the treatment group, and C denotes the control group.
39 The specific event categories are: Assassination, Attack, Direct Fire, IED Explosion, IED False, IED Founded/Cleared, IED Hoax, Indirect Fire, Mine Found, Mine Strike, Surface-to-Air Fire (SAFIRE), Security Breach, and Unexploded Ordinance. Attacks involving improvised explosive devices represent 43% of all incidents.
Dynamic Covariates
Given the real-time nature of air operations in Afghanistan, it is likely that the greatest threat to inference lies in selection bias: villages experiencing an airstrike or show of force may systematically differ from non-bombed villages. This bias hinges in turn on dynamic covariates, namely, the nature of prior or on-going clashes between insurgents and ISAF in a given location. Four battle-level covariates are therefore dynamically generated for each specified temporal and spatial window around first bombed villages and then for remaining non-bombed control villages.
First, the number of insurgent attacks prior to the air operation is calculated to account for insurgent violence and the presence of ISAF forces (Prior Attacks). Second, the number of pre-air operation ISAF military operations around a treated or control village is calculated (ISAF Ops).
40 These two variables account for the patterns of violence in and near a specified village as well as the battlefield distribution of forces.
Targeting is also driven partly by private information held about a particular village.
A third covariate, Info, records whether ISAF has received information about threats to ISAF forces and bases in a given location. There are 21,683 recorded threats against ISAF forces and installations across five threat categories.
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Fourth, a "Troops in Contact" (TIC ) covariate is constructed dynamically to indicate whether the air operation was intended to provide close air support for ISAF soldiers. If the air operation was a response to an insurgent or ISAF operation on that day, then TIC is assigned a value of 1. In these situations, potential control observations must also record an insurgent or ISAF operation on the same day to be eligible for matching. These data provide a crude proxy for a village's ethnic composition in the absence of more reliable, fine-grained data.
Findings
Three initial empirical tests are conducted below. I first examine the relationship between airstrikes and subsequent insurgent attacks. I then explore how these effects might differ when villages are subjected to repeated bombing. Finally, I turn to the issue of whether drone strikes-thought to be extremely selective and precise in their targeting-yield different behavioral outcomes than conventional airpower.
Effects of Airstrikes
Do airstrikes reduce subsequent insurgent attacks? Put simply, no. As Table 3 While exact matching provides the most stringent (and intuitive) set of paired comparisons, this rigor comes at a cost. Table 3 reveals that the proportion of treated observations used for exact matching diminishes to only 25% of all airstrikes when we reach the 90 day time window. This attrition stems from two sources. First, the requirement imposed by the TIC covariate dramatically reduces the pool of available controls since there were on average "only" 40 insurgent attacks each day over this time period. Second, large urban centers such as Kabul or Kandahar City, and even medium-sized district centers (e.g., Sangin) typically lack a suitable control given their population size. Since these locations also tend to be more violent, the exact matching results should be viewed as applying to smaller villages, which represent the vast majority of Afghanistan's settlements.
To reduce bias arising from incomplete matching due to attrition of treatment observations, 44 I relax the strict requirements of exact matching. All covariates in these "best matching" models are permitted to "float" within specified ranges. The result is a significant improvement in the number of treated observations included in these models. Note: Models include all covariates. "Treatment coverage" refers to the percentage of total treatment cases used in the estimation. "Village (N)" refers to the combined number of treated and control villages. Exact matching was used for prior insurgent and ISAF violence, ISAF private information, troops in contact, and the primary language of the village's inhabitants. Best matching allows these covariates to "float" within ≤.2 standardized bias of one another. A 2km 2 radius was used in all models to delineate the calculation of pre-and post-insurgent violence. Robust standard errors clustered on individual villages. ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05, † p=<.10
The Effects of Repeated Airstrikes
Given the dynamic nature of counterinsurgencies, it is unsurprising that many of the villages within our matched samples experienced multiple airstrikes over time. Repeated exposure to bombing enables us to explore whether airstrike effects are cumulative in nature. In particular, does repeated bombing lead to increased attrition of insurgents and punishment of civilians, thereby reducing attacks? Or do these attempts only backfire, multiplying grievances among civilian populations and leading to increased violence?
To tackle this question, I created History, which is the (logged) number of airstrikes a settlement has experienced before the current airstrike that is being matched on. I then reestimate Models 1-6 with the new History covariate.
Two main findings emerge (see Table 4 ). First, it is clear that while the inclusion of History leads to some attenuation of airstrike effects, the difference-in-difference estimate remains highly statistically significant and positively associated with insurgent attacks in all six models. 46 Second, History also emerges as positively associated with post-strike insurgent attacks in four of six models while just missing conventional levels of significance in a fifth. This finding runs counter to the claim that repeated bombing can successfully attrit insurgent organizations or drive their supporters away. To be sure, the level of bombing in Afghanistan pales in comparison to outlier cases such as US bombing campaigns in Vietnam or Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. Yet these data do contain locations that were struck dozens of times, including Urgun in Paktika province (N=127), Lashkar Gah (N=117) and Gereshk (N=115) in Helmand province, and Tirin Kot (N=96) in Uruzgan province. If airstrike effects are subject to curvilinear trends, it is apparent that these bombing levels are insufficient to reach a "tipping point" after which attrition leads to the degradation of insurgent capabilities.
Drones
A prominent public debate has arisen around the effectiveness (and ethics) of drone strikes.
Proponents emphasize the precise and selective nature of these airstrikes, characteristics that represents a "most likely" case for observing a negative relationship between airstrikes and subsequent insurgent attacks. 47 Critics contend, however, that these airstrikes predominantly kill civilians, creating grievances that facilitate insurgent recruitment and increase militant attacks both locally and abroad.
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Much of this debate has centered around the use of drones in Pakistan and Yemen.
Afghanistan, by contrast, has been relatively ignored, despite the fact that more drone strikes have occurred here (N=943) than in all other locations combined. I examine the question of drone effectiveness by reestimating Models 1-6 with a binary variable, Drone, designating whether an airstrike was conducted by a remotely piloted vehicle. As Table A1 (see Appendix) outlines, Drones only (barely) reaches conventional levels of statistical significance in one of six models. Moreover, Drones are positively associated with an increased 46 This attenuation is unsurprising given the high degree of correlation between the two variables in both the exact (.62) and best (.70) matching datasets. amount of insurgent attacks, exactly the opposite relationship expected by proponents of their use. The estimated increase in insurgent attacks is, however, substantially smaller than non-drone airstrikes, suggesting that drones are at least less counterproductive than their manned counterparts. 49 While the current focus on drones is perhaps understandable, a fixation on their use to the exclusion of comparison with other aircraft misses the fact that neither type of airstrike appears to be having the intended suppressive effect on insurgent attacks.
Robustness Checks
I reexamine these findings from Models 1-6 using multiple robustness checks (see Appendix for details). Four in particular deserve special mention.
First, I conduct a placebo test by randomly reassigning (with replacement) all airstrikes to three different sets of populated centers, which preserves the within-village auto-correlation of outcomes.
50 If the airstrikes are indeed having a positive effect on subsequent insurgent attacks, this difference should disappear once we compare placebo treated locations and their control counterparts since no airstrike actually occurred. As Tables A2, A3 , and A4 demonstrate, this is indeed the case: once the airstrikes are reassigned randomly, a statistically significant difference between placebo treated and control villages is observed only once in 18 trials (Models 1-6 repeated on each pseudo-sample). This placebo test ensures that the treatment effects of airstrikes are genuine rather than an artifact of the data collection or estimation process.
Second, I cross-validate these findings using a second, independently-collected, dataset of insurgent and ISAF-initiated violent events. These data were collected by iMMAP, a non-governmental organization that pools together field reports from various NGOs and government agencies (but not ISAF) operating throughout Afghanistan. About 98,000
observations were recorded for the 1 January 2008 to 1 June 2012 timeframe. The dataset's coverage of insurgent attacks against ISAF is less comprehensive than ISAF's own CIDNE.
It does, however, have the advantage of recording attacks against Afghan National Security Forces, including the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, that are omitted 49 Drones is also not significant when used as a treatment for matching across the entire airstrike dataset (see Table A1 ).
50 Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004. from CIDNE. Reestimating Models 1-6 with iMMAP data returns similar results; airstrikes are positively associated with increased insurgent attacks in all models and the results are statistically and substantively similar (Table A5 ). These findings are not products of CIDNE's coding rules or data generating process.
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Third, I reestimate these models using each of the airstrike dataset's three constituent sources (CAOC, DAPS, and CIDNE) separately. This is a particularly strict test given the lack of overlap between these sources and their own coding idiosyncrasies. Yet despite these differences, the models return remarkably consistent estimates of airstrike effects across the three sources. In all models, the difference between bombed locations and their controls is highly significant and positively associated with increased post-strike insurgent attacks (Table A6) . CAOC data generally provides the largest estimates of airstrike effects, though the coefficients are similar across all three sources.
Fourth, I split the best matching sample according to a binary term (Disturbance) that indicates whether additional airstrikes occurred within the 7, 45, or 90 day post-airstrike windows. 52 These additional airstrikes could confound our estimates since they represent a violation of difference-in-difference's assumption of parallel trends in treated and control observations. As Table A7 outlines, our estimates of treatment effects remain largely unchanged statistically or substantively in the observations without post-strike disturbances, the vast majority of observations in each sample. Villages recording at least one additional airstrike in the post-treatment window, though a small percentage of the overall sample, do exhibit different treatment estimates. Airstrikes no longer have a statistically significant relationship with insurgent attacks. These villages are typically the target of rare, sustained military operations designed to capture strategic locations. As such, they pose a special challenge for causal inference since isolating the effect of any one airstrike is difficult when so many are occurring within tight temporal and spatial windows.
Finally, additional robustness checks are outlined in the Appendix. These include:
(1) subsetting the results annually to test for period effects associated with exogenous changes such as the 2010 troop surge (Table A8) ; (2) reestimating these models with five district-level covariates (Table A9) ; 53 (3) subsetting the data to examine whether locations with no insurgent attacks in the pre-treatment window differ markedly from villages with pre-strike insurgent violence (Table A10) ; and (4) recoding the dependent variable as an ordinal variable (increase/no change/decrease) and reestimating models with ordered logistic regression (Table A11 ). In nearly every case, airstrikes are statistically significant and positively associated with increased post-strike insurgent attacks. Estimates of treatment effects remain remarkably resistant to the inclusion of additional district variables and subsetting efforts, increasing our confidence in the direction and magnitude of the relationship between airstrikes and insurgent violence.
Mechanisms
These empirical tests drive home the conclusion that airstrikes had counterproductive effects on insurgent violence in Afghanistan. The mechanisms underpinning this relationship remain unclear, however. 54 It is tempting, for example, to simply ascribe these findings to civilian casualties: conventional wisdom, after all, suggests that airstrikes, no matter how precise, kill civilians, creating grievances that lead to increased insurgent recruitment and renewed cycles of escalating violence. Yet as we observe below, there is little evidence to suggest that the observed uptick in insurgent attacks stems from civilian fatalities. Instead, evidence suggests that an alternative mechanism-insurgent concerns about their local reputations for resolve-may dictate how insurgents meet the challenge posed by airpower.
The Surprising (Non-)Role of Civilian Casualties
Are grievances arising from civilian casualties the link between airstrikes and observed in- (farms). I also incorporate contextual data, including the number of weapons dropped and whether the airstrike was conducted by remotely-piloted vehicles and intended for highvalue targets (HVT) such as insurgent leaders. I then use Coarsened Exact Matching as a robustness check to more narrowly match airstrikes that harmed civilians with "control" airstrikes that did not result in civilian casualties.
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Existing scholarship almost exclusively relies on estimates of fatalities (and, less often, the number of individuals wounded) to measure civilian victimization. In these terms, Figure A1 plots the location of all 216 incidents.
Using civilian deaths as our central measure of victimization omits other forms of suffering that may also be drivers of insurgent violence, however. To overcome this limitation, every airstrike and show of force was cross-referenced with open source satellite imagery of the targeted location. All 23,000 events were examined independently by two coders using a six-fold classification scheme: compounds (e.g., homes); other buildings; farms; roads; 55 Iacus, King and Porro 2012. 56 ISAF data are unfortunately far from complete and seriously underreport civilian casualties inflicted by airstrikes. The CCTC uses two categories-confirmed and unconfirmed-to generate estimates. By these standards, 71 or 132 individuals were killed by airstrikes between January 2009 and March 2010, respectively. By contrast, our data suggest between 312 and 634 individuals were killed over the same time span. Moreover, many CIVCAS airstrikes are relegated to the "unconfirmed" category for reasons that remain unclear. For example, the September 2009 airstrike in Kunduz that killed between 56 and 150 civilians only appears in the "unconfirmed" category.
other settlement types; and unpopulated areas. A blast radii for the given bomb size was dynamically generated and then superimposed over the location's grid coordinates to identify which objects to code.
57 Initial intercoder reliability was high (85%); all remaining discrepancies were reconciled by a third coder.
These data indicate that at least 1,478 compounds were struck, along with 2,911 farms, 418 buildings, and 882 road segments. A further 3,975 strikes hit unpopulated areas; these reflect efforts to hit insurgents as they move through forests or other terrain features. P (.58) × .3048, where R is the blast radius (in meters), W is the weight of the bomb (assumed here to be 50% explosive by weight) and P is the blast overpressure generated as measured by pounds per square inch (PSI). I use a PSI value of 5 here, which is deemed sufficient to destroy typical buildings in Afghanistan within this radius. Note that fragmentation radius is often much larger but these more detailed calculations require additional (classified) information, including fuse settings, angle of attack, and altitude of weapons release. I thank Ted Postol for a detailed discussion of this issue. See also Driels 2004. 58 A further 1064 airstrikes were conducted within a settlement but did not hit buildings, roads, or farms. 59 See, for example, Ladbury 2009. 60 Without access to classified material, this is surely an undercount, both in the numbers of decapitated leaders and failed attempts.
(History), generated dynamically by the matching program for each airstrike; and, finally, a binary variable for whether civilians were harmed during the airstrike (CIVCAS ).
In total, 19 covariates are included. Given the model's complexity, I use these estimations as a "first-pass" to identify potentially significant covariates (as reported in Table   A10 ). I then estimate a reduced form regression using only covariates that obtained a p=0.05 level of statistical significance. The resulting models have a more manageable 10 covariates; results are presented in Table 5 .
Several findings emerge. First, CIVCAS is typically associated with a decrease in insurgent attacks, though this relationship only reaches statistical significance in one model. Second, there is some evidence that airstrikes that hit compounds and (especially) farms are associated with an increase in post-strike insurgent attacks. These results do not extend beyond the 45-day mark, however, and in the case of compounds-perhaps the form of property damage most closely tied to civilian harm-the effect does not even reach the 45-day mark. Evidence for grievance-based accounts is therefore quite modest.
By contrast, nearly all of the covariates that capture war-fighting dynamics are statistically significant and substantively important. Troops-in-contact situations, where insurgent and ISAF forces are directly engaged, are especially prone to observe an armed insurgent response even 90 days after the initial event. Similarly, a history that includes past ISAF operations and being repeatedly bombed is associated with a sharp increase in post-strike insurgent attacks. Notable, too, is the fact that Season is also associated with an marked increase in post-strike insurgent attacks.
The claim that insurgent attacks appear unaffected by, or even negatively correlated with, civilian casualties is undoubtedly controversial. I therefore reestimate these models using minimum and maximum estimates (logged) of killed and wounded civilians (see Table   A13 ). Once again, CIVCAS is typically negatively associated with insurgent attacks, a relationship that just misses conventional significance levels at the 90-day mark.
This estimation strategy may be problematic if "control" airstrikes are not representative of airstrikes that harmed civilians, however. I therefore re-estimate the reduced form regression using 1:1 Coarsened Exact Matching and CIVCAS as the treatment. As Table 5 reveals, the results remain unchanged: civilian casualties are unconnected to observed changes in insurgent attacks. Finally, I test two interaction terms: CIVCAS*Compound, which denotes the "most likely" instance where we might observe a link between airstrikes, grievances/revenge, and subsequent insurgent attacks; and CIVCAS*History, where civilian casualties and repeated exposure to bombing might also generate grievances that translate into insurgent violence.
These tests muster little evidence for a grievance-based interpretation of post-strike insurgent attacks (Table A14) This discussion is not meant to minimize the suffering caused by airstrikes, of course.
Yet it appears unlikely that the "quick fuse" logic of civilian victimization rapidly producing surges in insurgent violence is at work in this case. While the Taliban's use of airstrikes as a recruitment device is well documented, 62 it appears that the link between heightened recruitment and subsequent increases in violence is not as automatic as typically assumed.
At least in the short term, insurgent violence appears unconnected to civilian casualties and instead governed by tactical or other considerations. The difference-in-difference empirical strategy used here cannot rule out "slow burn" variants of this argument, where grievances from airstrikes (or other violence) accumulate and fester for many months, even years, before an individual takes action against counterinsurgent forces. Assigning causal weight to any one event becomes harder, however, as the time lag between the incident and the response lengthens.
64 Smith 2013, 205-07. air power, which removes the ability to discount or ignore their effects, placing additional pressure on insurgents to match these actions with their own.
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Taliban strategy has also evolved over time to reflect the importance of cultivating a positive image among local populations, though there are limits to such efforts. 
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This reputational mechanism suggests two behavioral indicators. First, if reputational dynamics are driving insurgent violence, then we should witness insurgent "push-back"
even after non-lethal shows of force -simulated bomb runs where no ordinance is actually dropped -since these are also highly visible signals that could drive a wedge between rebels and locals. Second, this mechanism suggests that insurgent responses should be localized. That is, the causal effect of an airstrike should dissipate sharply as distance from the bombed location increases since insurgents emphasize their local standing.
Shows of force
Seeking to reduce civilian casualties, the US Air Force began experimenting with the use of non-lethal shows of force in 2007 to dissuade insurgents from pressing home their attacks.
From a causal inference standpoint, these shows of force provide an ideal opportunity to test the competing logics of the civilian victimization and reputational mechanisms. Shows 65 For these reasons, the Taliban has routinely cast the use of airpower as a "cowardly" way of fighting since it limits the Taliban's ability to engager directly with ISAF soldiers in "fair fights." See Gopal 2014, 3522. 66 Giustozzi 2013, 248-49. 67 See, for example, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 2011b; Malkasian 2013, 154-55,211-12. 68 Gopal 2014, 3617. 69 The Taliban's leadership pays bonuses for outstanding attacks that match or blunt ISAF's own visible successes (i.e. an airstrike that kills Taliban commanders). See Gopal 2014, 3887. of force were conducted in similar locations and situations as airstrikes but, as simulated bomb runs, did not impose any harm on civilians or their property. Moreover, there is also an element of quasi-randomness to the choice between airstrikes and shows of force.
Though the specific guidelines governing the selection of these operations are classified, a USAF Targeting Officer emphasized the contingency inherent in this choice:
A commander one day may call in a show of force and the same commander the next day call for dropping a bomb. Conversely, in the absolutely identical situation with two different commanders, one might for a SOF while the other calls for a bomb. . . Only machines make the same decisions over and over again given the same inputs. I would say there is a large amount of discretion in how the ground commanders are allowed to respond to the situations they face.
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I therefore repeat the dynamic matching process used above, this time using shows of force as the treatment condition. Do shows of force generate the same type of effects as airstrikes? Surprisingly, yes. As Table 6 there are collectively 21,526 attacks that can be attributed to these non-lethal operations (95% CI of [17, 068] to [25, 856] ).
In light of these findings, it is difficult to suggest that shows of force act as credible deterrents to future insurgent behavior. Yet dismissing them as mere "cheap talk" also Note: Models include all covariates. "Treatment coverage" refers to the percentage of total treatment cases used in the estimation. "Village (N)" refers to the combined number of treated and control villages. Exact matching was used for prior insurgent and ISAF violence, ISAF private information, troops in contact, and the primary language of the village's inhabitants. Best matching allows these covariates to "float" within ≤.2 standardized bias of one another. A 2km 2 radius was used in all models to delineate the calculation of pre-and post-insurgent violence. Robust standard errors clustered on individual villages. ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05, † p=<.10 misses the mark. Insurgents are clearly responding to these "cost-less" operations in ways that suggest they find such actions threatening even if no material cost is being imposed. To be sure, a comparison of the magnitude of difference-in-difference estimates after airstrikes and shows of force indicate that airstrikes are generating greater insurgent "push-back,"
at least as measured here by the number of attacks. Nonetheless, the fact that shows of force are being met with increases in violence without imposing material costs or incurring civilian casualties suggest that insurgents are maneuvering to protect their reputations for effectiveness in the eyes of local audiences.
Do Effects Diffuse?
The proposed reputation mechanism also suggests that airstrike effects on insurgent violence should be quite localized. To test this claim, I reestimate Models 4-6 from 
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Several trends are notable (see Table 7 ). For example, airstrikes are associated with a net increase in insurgent attacks across all seven spatial windows. These difference-indifference estimates are all statistically significant, though only barely so at 50 and 100 km 2 radii for the 120 post-strike window, suggesting some decay in effect as distance increases.
The absolute value of the estimated difference-in-difference is also increasing as the spatial window is widened for each temporal window. At the 7 day mark, for example, the estimated difference is .371 more insurgent attacks in the 2km 2 around the targeted village (with a 95% CI of [.31, .44] 71 These variable windows also help mitigate any possible mis-measurement arising from inaccuracies in bomb strike location data. Note: Models 4-6 from Table 3 . The minimum distance between treated and control observations is reset with each change to ensure that controls are not drawn from within the spatial boundaries around treated observations. ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05, † p=<.10
We should not conclude, however, that airstrike effects are mechanically increasing over distance, for two reasons. First, the rate of increase in the size of the estimated differencein-difference is consistently largest when moving from 2 km 2 to 10 km 2 ; that is, within the local vicinity of the bombed location. By contrast, when shifting from 50 km 2 to 100 km 2 , the rate of increase is on average less than one-half that of the 2 km 2 to 10km 2 shift despite sharply increase the spatial catchment area. To take one example, the estimated difference-in-difference increases 3.4x when shifting from 2 km 2 to 10 2 but only 1.3x when moving from a 50 km 2 to 100 km 2 radius for the 45 day time period. 72 Put differently, the rate at which insurgent attacks increase slows markedly once we move beyond the fairly narrow 10 km 2 area around the bombed location.
Second, the difference-in-difference estimate comes to represent a declining share of the bombed village's post-strike insurgent violence as distance from the village increases. For example, the .371 more attacks observed in the 2km 2 , 7 day temporal window represents 44% of total attacks from (and near) that village (95% CI of [36%, 51%]). By contrast, the 2.14 more attacks observed at the 100km 2 , 7 day temporal window represents only 5.5%
of total insurgent attack in and near that location (95% CI of [3%, 8%]). Similarly, the estimated 3.081 more attacks we observe at the 2km 2 , 120 day temporal window represents about 35% of total post-strike violence in and near that bombed village (95% CI of [27%, 42%]). Resetting the spatial parameter at 100km 2 for the same 120 day temporal window reveals that the 16.81 increased attacks represents only 3.6% of the total post-strike violence around that bombed village (95% CI of [−.65%, 7.8%]).
In short, airstrikes have remarkably persistent effects on insurgent attacks over different spatial and temporal windows. The bulk of these effects, however, are concentrated spatially in the immediate vicinity of the bombing, with the rate of increase falling sharply once we move beyond 10 km 2 of the targeted village. These findings are consistent with the expectations that insurgents will privilege responding locally, and quickly, to airstrikes.
Conclusion
This paper has marshaled evidence to support the claim that a robust positive relationship exists between airstrikes and insurgent attacks. While the costs of airstrike-induced civil-72 The corresponding rate of increase for the 7 day period is 2.65x (2 km 2 to 10 km 2 ) and 1.27x (50 km 2 to 100 km 2 ); for the 90 day period, 3.4x to 1.89x; and 3.6x to 1.8x at the 120 day temporal window.
ian casualties certainly should not be minimized, these findings also indicate that civilian fatalities do not explain the uptick in insurgent attacks after both airstrikes and shows of force. This surprising (non-)finding may stem partly from the literature's too-narrow conception of civilian harm as fatalities: compound and farm damage, for example, was sometimes positively associated with net increases in insurgent attacks, suggesting an alternative pathway by which grievances could explain insurgent violence.
These empirical patterns are better explained by appealing to the reputational demands facing local Taliban groups, however. An emphasis on reputational dynamics not only accounts for the positive association between airstrikes and insurgent violence but also explains the localized nature of responses, the insensitivity of insurgent violence to ISAFinduced civilian casualties, and the fact that non-lethal shows of force can still provoke increased insurgent attacks. In short, "face," as Schelling famously noted, "is one of the few things worth fighting over."
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Several theoretical extensions flow from these findings. Much more work needs to be done in exploring how the rebel-population relationship conditions wartime dynamics, including the value insurgents place on their local reputations. Subsetting our microlevel datasets according to insurgent organization (and numbers operating in the same space)
to test for conditional average treatment effects is one obvious next step. Variation in reputational concerns could also be used to explain different dependent variables, including violence against civilians, the sophistication of rebel tactics, or the nature of tactical substitution across the group's portfolio of violence. The adoption of other empirical approaches, including survey experiments to measure wartime attitudes toward insurgent organizations indirectly, would provide the non-observational data necessary to examine the incentives driving insurgent organizations when responding to the counterinsurgent's violence.
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On the joint methodological-empirical front, the paper's SQL-enabled approach to capturing wartime dynamics can be extended in several directions. The interaction between different forms of aerial coercion could be set in a dynamic treatment framework that would explicitly analyze how switching between strategies, as well as the cumulative effects of these switches over time, affect insurgent behavior. 75 Similarly, the interaction of these strategies with non-violent approaches -notably, the use of aid programs to win "hearts and minds" -could be modeled directly to enrich our understanding of the conditionality of violence. How violence and casualties are perceived by local audiences may hinge at least partly on economic assistance programs that condition who is blamed for inflicting harm and damage within a given village, for example.
Despite the substantive importance of studying the United States' longest and most expensive war, we might wonder about the generalizability of these findings beyond Afghanistan.
There are, of course, limits to any single study. 
